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KEEPING UP WITH THE GAME: THE USE OF 
THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION IN PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT CASES 
Lance Wyatt† 
Determining damages is an integral stage in the patent litigation 
process. Since 1970, reasonable royalty damages have been calculated 
using the factors set forth in the seminal decision Georgia-Pacific Corp. 
v. United States Plywood Corp. However, these factors are prone to 
manipulation and abuse by damages experts. To address this abuse, 
damages experts have utilized a solution to a two-person bargaining 
situation, the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), as a method to 
calculate reasonable royalty damages in patent infringement cases. 
Since the introduction of NBS in patent infringement cases, courts have 
been reluctant to admit the use of the NBS to calculate reasonable 
royalty damages because damages experts often fail to apply the 
specific facts of the case to their calculations or adequately explain the 
NBS. 
This article argues that courts should allow the use of the NBS by 
damages experts as a viable method to calculate a reasonable royalty 
in patent infringement cases, despite recent backlash at the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals. First, the NBS, if properly used, adequately 
applies the facts of each specific case to its analysis. Second, the NBS 
is grounded in sound, unmanipulable economic theory that can be 
adequately explained. Finally, the NBS is more impartial than the 
Georgia-Pacific analysis. 
  
 
 † J.D., 2014, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.S. Biomedical Engineering, 2011, Texas 
A&M University. The author is currently clerking as a judicial law clerk for a district judge in the 
United States District Court for the District of Nevada. The author dedicates this article to his 
mother, Marcy Boyd Rhodes. The author also dedicates this article to John Nash, who passed 
away in a tragic car accident shortly before its publication, and whose pioneering research in game 
theory provides the basis for this article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Determining damages is an integral stage in the patent litigation 
process. Reasonable royalty damages are the prevalent form of relief in 
patent cases.1 Section 284 of the Patent Act governs damages in these 
cases and provides that, at a minimum, a patent holder should receive 
a reasonable royalty for the use of the invention by the infringer upon 
a finding of infringement.2 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
has defined a reasonable royalty as: 
[T]he amount of money which the owner of a patent would accept 
who is desirous of licensing another to use her patent in return for a 
royalty, but is not forced by financial need or other compulsion to 
 
 1. John C. Jarosz & Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical Negotiation and Reasonable 
Royalty Damages: The Tail Wagging the Dog, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 769, 769 (2013). 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
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do so, and the amount which a person would be willing to pay as a 
royalty who is desirous of obtaining a license to use the invention, 
but who is not compelled to do so.3 
Since 1970, reasonable royalty damages have been calculated 
using the factors set forth in the seminal decision, Georgia-Pacific 
Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.4 These factors are used to 
 
 3. Maxwell v. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 4. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970). The factors include:  
(1) The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, 
proving or tending to prove an established royalty.  
(2) The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the 
patent in suit.  
(3) The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as 
restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the 
manufactured product may be sold.  
(4) The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent 
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses 
under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.  
(5) The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, 
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of 
business; or whether they are inventor and promoter.  
(6) The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products 
of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a 
generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative 
or convoyed sales.  
(7) The duration of the patent and the term of the license.  
(8) The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its 
commercial success; and its current popularity.  
(9) The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or 
devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results. 
(10) The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial 
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to 
those who have used the invention.  
(11) The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any 
evidence probative of the value of that use.  
(12) The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the 
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the 
invention or analogous inventions.  
(13) The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as 
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, 
business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.  
(14) The opinion testimony of qualified experts.  
(15) The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the 
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if 
both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that 
is, the amount which a prudent licensee—who desired, as a business 
proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article 
embodying the patented invention—would have been willing to pay as a 
royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would 
have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a 
license.  
Id. at 1120. 
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construct a hypothetical negotiation between a patent holder and an 
infringer at the time the patent was first infringed.5 However, these 
factors are prone to manipulation and abuse by damages experts.6 
Because of these problems with existing methods, damages experts 
have introduced alternative methods to calculate a reasonable royalty. 
In 1950, John Nash, Jr., developed a solution to a two-person 
bargaining situation.7 While its soundness in economic theory has been 
established for over 60 years, the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) has 
only recently burst onto the scene in the calculation of reasonable 
royalty damages in patent infringement cases. In its simplest terms, the 
NBS “compares the profits for each party—proceeding rationally, 
competently, and fully informed—both in entering and not entering 
into the completed transaction. Relative bargaining positions determine 
how the parties split the gains provided by the contemplated 
agreement.”8  
Economists William Choi and Roy Weinstein tailored the NBS in 
2001 for the calculation of reasonable royalty damages in patent 
infringement cases.9 Additionally, Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro 
tailored the NBS as a method to calculate reasonable royalty damages 
in 2007.10 Since then, countless legal scholars have examined the NBS 
in relation to reasonable royalty damages. The NBS first found its way 
onto the patent infringement landscape in 2011.11 
Since its introduction in patent infringement cases, district courts 
have been reluctant to admit the use of the NBS to calculate reasonable 
royalty damages. Two reasons have fueled this reluctance. First, 
damages experts often use the NBS improperly, failing to apply the 
specific facts of the case to their calculations.12 Second, damages 
experts typically fail to adequately explain the NBS to courts and 
 
 5. See Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 1, at 772. 
 6. See infra Part IV.C. 
 7. See John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950). 
 8. John. B. Scherling & Ryan M. Sullivan, Rational Reasonable Royalty Damages: A 
Return to the Roots, 4 LANDSLIDE, Nov.–Dec. 2011, at 56, 57–58.  
 9. See William Choi & Roy Weinstein, An Analytical Solution to Reasonable Royalty 
Rate Calculations, 41 IDEA 49 (2001). 
 10. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1991 (2007). 
 11. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 12. See id. at 1119 (“In particular, Dr. Cockburn glossed over the axioms underlying the 
Nash solution without citing any evidence to show that those assumptions were warranted in the 
present case. In this respect, his analysis was not based on sufficient facts.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
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juries.13 While most district courts have not allowed the use of the NBS 
in patent cases, some district courts have allowed its use.14 However, 
the Federal Circuit recently expressed disdain toward the NBS, 
agreeing “with the courts that have rejected invocations of the Nash 
theorem without sufficiently establishing that the premises of the 
theorem actually apply to the facts of the case at hand.”15 
Despite this distaste, courts should allow the use of the NBS by 
damages experts as a viable method to calculate a reasonable-royalty 
rate in patent infringement cases for three reasons. First, if properly 
used, the NBS adequately applies the facts of each specific case to its 
analysis. Second, the NBS is grounded in sound, unmanipulable 
economic theory that can be adequately explained. Third, the NBS is 
more impartial than the Georgia-Pacific analysis. 
While many legal scholars have examined the NBS in relation to 
patent damages, few scholars have examined it in light of the Federal 
Circuit’s recent VirnetX opinion and subsequent district court opinions. 
Even fewer scholars have advocated for the use of the NBS as a viable 
method for calculating a reasonable-royalty rate in patent cases. This 
article analyzes the recent court decisions regarding the NBS and 
advocates for its use, despite significant judicial hostility. 
Many methods have been used to calculate reasonable royalty 
damages, including the longstanding Georgia-Pacific analysis, the 
analytical approach, the entire-market-value rule, the established 
royalty for the patent, the cost-savings approach, and the rule-of-thumb 
approach.16 In 2011, the 25% rule of thumb, used by courts as a tool to 
determine reasonable royalty in patent cases, was held inadmissible by 
the Federal Circuit.17 The rule presumed that a licensee in a 
hypothetical negotiation would be willing to pay a royalty rate of 25% 
of the profits from the product that incorporated the patent at issue.18 
However, in Uniloc, the Federal Circuit abolished the rule as a 
“fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a 
hypothetical negotiation.”19 The court reasoned that “[e]vidence 
relying on the 25 percent rule of thumb is thus inadmissible under 
 
 13. See id. (“He did not, however, adequately explain this method or tie it to facts in the 
record.”) 
 14. See infra Part III.  
 15. Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  
 16. See Methodologies for Determining Reasonable Royalty Damages, FISH & 
RICHARDSON, http://www.fr.com/reasonableroyalty/ (last visited May 19, 2015).  
 17. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 18. Id. at 1312. 
 19. Id. at 1315.  
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Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence, because it fails to tie a 
reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case at issue.”20 Although 
Uniloc attempted to apply the Georgia-Pacific factors to adjust the 
25% baseline rate up or down, the court explained that, because the 
analysis started from a fundamentally flawed premise, “adjusting it 
based on legitimate considerations specific to the facts of the case 
nevertheless results in a fundamentally flawed conclusion.”21 
Since 2011, courts have been quick to reject the NBS for the same 
reasons articulated by the Federal Circuit in abolishing the 25% rule of 
thumb in Uniloc.22 Most courts quickly assume that the NBS is a 50% 
rule of thumb shrouded in complex mathematics.23 However, as this 
article will demonstrate, the NBS is a sound economic theory that often 
produces royalty rates other than 50%. While most courts have not 
allowed the use of the NBS in patent cases, some courts have allowed 
its use under very narrow circumstances. For example, one court 
allowed a damages expert to use the NBS “as a check on the 
reasonableness of the rate reached through his Georgia-Pacific 
analysis.”24  
In patent cases, courts have generally stated that the use of the 
NBS to calculate a reasonable royalty is impermissible because it 
cannot be adequately explained and it does not apply the specific facts 
of the case to its calculations.25 However, this article will demonstrate 
that the NBS can become a viable method for calculating reasonable 
royalty without running afoul of the concerns expressed by the Federal 
Circuit.  
The NBS has been in existence for over 50 years and, since then, 
has been peer-reviewed by countless economists and legal theorists. 
Working from this foundation, economists and damages experts 
William Choi and Roy Weinstein developed equations that tailored the 
NBS to the reasonable-royalty calculation.26 The variables in these 
equations force damages experts to apply the specific facts of a case to 
the NBS. These variables include the disagreement payoff for the 
patent holder, representing the profit the patent holder/licensor expects 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1317. 
 22. See infra Part III.A.  
 23. See Oracle, supra note 10.  
 24. Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., No. C-08-04990 JW, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 56784, at *15–16, n.19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012), aff’d, 764 F.3d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
 25. See infra Part III.A.  
 26. See Choi & Weinstein, supra note 9. 
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to receive if the negotiation fails, the disagreement payoff for the 
infringer, the feasible payoff from licensing, which is the total profit 
from licensing, and the profit for the patent holder and infringer, 
respectively, from licensing.27 Finally, utilization of these formulas 
provides impartial results, which are favorable when compared to the 
easily-manipulable Georgia-Pacific analysis. 
Proper utilization of the NBS as a viable method used to calculate 
a reasonable royalty in patent cases would have many positive 
implications. For example, it would provide impartial results that 
would be difficult to manipulate. Moreover, it would ground the 
damages calculation in sound economic theory, rather than in 
manipulable factors that are burdensome and difficult to explain.  
This article will demonstrate why courts should allow the use of 
the NBS as a viable method to determine reasonable royalties in patent 
infringement cases. Part I of this article provides an overview of the 
NBS and its relation to determining reasonable royalty damages. Part 
II examines cases that have either allowed or rejected the use of the 
NBS. Part III explains why courts should use the NBS by 
demonstrating its incorporation of the facts of each case, its ability to 
be adequately explained, and its impartiality compared to the Georgia-
Pacific factor analysis. Finally, Part IV concludes the article by urging 
damages experts and courts alike to utilize the NBS to determine 
reasonable royalty damages. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION 
In 1950, John Nash, Jr. developed a solution to a two-person 
cooperative-bargaining situation.28 This area of economics is known as 
game theory, and Nash was eventually awarded a Nobel Prize in 1994 
for his solution.29 Nash described his solution as “a determination of 
the amount of satisfaction each individual should expect to get from the 
situation, or, rather, a determination of how much it should be worth to 
each of these individuals to have this opportunity to bargain.”30 For 
more than 60 years, Nash’s solution has garnered praise throughout the 
 
 27. See id. at 54–55. 
 28. See Nash, The Bargaining Problem, supra note 7. 
 29. Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize 
in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1994 (Oct. 11, 1994). 
 30. See Nash, The Bargaining Problem, supra note 7, at 155.  
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economic community and has been widely accepted as a sound 
economic theory.31 
An understanding of the NBS is enhanced by a cursory overview 
of the theory of bilateral monopoly, a market with one buyer and one 
seller. This theory teaches that a negotiated price between one buyer 
and one seller cannot be precisely specified, but rather will be found in 
an indeterminate range.32 As economists, Roy Weinstein, Frank 
Stabile, and Ken Romig, explain: 
This range is determined by each party’s “walk away” price. For the 
buyer (i.e. the defendant or hypothetical licensee), this price 
represents any price above the highest possible price it is willing to 
pay. For the seller (i.e. the plaintiff or hypothetical licensor), the 
walk-away price represents any price below the lowest possible 
price it is willing to accept. The range of prices between the seller’s 
minimum price and the buyer’s maximum price constitute a range 
of mutually acceptable prices.33 
The NBS, therefore, allows one to narrow or, in some cases, 
eliminate this range of indeterminacy by providing “a generally 
accepted framework for identifying and evaluating factors that 
influence negotiation outcomes between parties.”34 
In 2001, economists William Choi and Roy Weinstein realized 
that the NBS could be used to calculate reasonable royalty damages in 
 
 31. The following is a list of recommended reading regarding the economics and 
mathematics behind the NBS: John Nash, Two-Person Cooperative Games, 21 ECONOMETRICA, 
128 (1953); Kenneth Chan, Trade Negotiations in a Nash Bargaining Model, 25 J. INT’L ECON. 
353 (1988); Mark Gertler & Antonella Trigari, Unemployment Fluctuations with Staggered Nash 
Wage Bargaining, 117 J. POL. ECON. 38 (2009); Eric Greenleaf et al., Guarantees in Auctions: 
The Action House as Negotiator and Managerial Decision Maker, 39 MGMT. SCI. 1130 (1993); 
Eran Hanany et al., Final-Offer Arbitration and Risk Aversion Bargaining, 53 MGMT. SCI. 1785 
(2007); Lawrence Kahn, Free Agency, Long-Term Contracts and Compensation in Major League 
Baseball: Estimates from Panel Data, 75 REV. ECON. & STAT. 157 (1993); Amitava Krishna Dutt 
& Anindya Sen, Union Bargaining Power, Employment, and Output in a Model of Monopolistic 
Competition with Wage Bargaining, 65 J. ECON. 1 (1997); Alvin E. Roth, Axiomatic Models of 
Bargaining, (M. Beckmann & H. P. Kunzi eds., 1979); PAUL SAMUELSON & WILLIAM 
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS (William Nordhaus ed., 12th ed. 1985); ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME 
THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (1991); Ken Binmore et al., The Nash Bargaining Solution in 
Economic Modeling, 17 RAND J. ECON. 176 (1986); Ariel Rubenstein et al., On the Interpretation 
of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences, 60 
ECONOMETRICA 1171 (1992). 
 32. Roy Weinstein et al., Taming Complex Intellectual Property Compensation Problems, 
22 FED. CIR. B.J. 547, 554 (2013). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 555. 
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patent infringement cases.35 First, they noted the conditions, or axioms, 
that Nash used in his theory.36 These axioms are as follows: 
(1) Pareto efficiency; that is, there should be no other feasible 
allocation that is (a) better than the solution for one negotiator 
and (b) not worse than the solution for the other negotiator.  
(2) Negotiators must collectively behave in a rational manner such 
that neither side gets less in the bargaining solution than could be 
obtained in disagreement.  
(3) The solution is independent of any numeric specification; that is, 
if we change the way we measure the payoffs when we construct 
a two-person bargaining problem, then the solution corresponds 
to the same outcome. 
(4) Eliminating alternatives other than the disagreement profits 
(opportunity costs from licensing) that would not have been 
chosen should not affect the solution. 
(5) If the disagreement profits of the two parties are equal in the 
bargaining problem, then the solution also should treat them 
equally.37 
With these conditions as a foundation, the authors noted that 
“Nash demonstrated that satisfying these conditions yields a unique 
solution . . . where the bargaining outcome rests simply on each 
negotiator’s alternative to negotiating and the potential benefits of 
cooperation.”38 In other words, the satisfaction of these conditions 
results in an outcome dependent upon the bargaining parties’ back-up 
alternatives and the benefits arising from a mutual cooperation. 
The authors then applied Nash’s theory to reasonable royalty 
damages, stating that “the NBS requires only knowledge or estimation 
of (1) the ‘disagreement’ profits of both the licensee and licensor; and 
(2) the total profits from a licensing agreement.”39 First, the authors 
defined the variables necessary to perform the NBS in a reasonable-
royalty context.40 One of the variables included the disagreement 
profits of the patent holder.41 Disagreement profits represent the profits 
a patent holder expects to receive in the event that negotiation fails.42 
 
 35. See Choi & Weinstein, supra note 9.  
 36. Id. at 53. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. at 54. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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The authors defined this variable as d1.43 Next, the authors defined the 
variable of the disagreement profits of the infringer/licensee as d2.44 
This variable represents the profits that an infringer/licensee expects to 
receive in the event that negotiation fails.45 The disagreement profits 
are representative of each party’s relative bargaining position.46 If 
either party has backup plans in the event that negotiation fails, their 
bargaining position increases, relative to the value of the backup 
plans.47 Additionally, the authors defined the variable Π as the total 
incremental profit from licensing.48 Finally, the authors defined the 
variables π1 and π2 “as profit for the patent holder and 
infringer/licensee, respectively, from licensing.”49 
After defining the variables, the authors developed equations 
combining the defined variables and the Nash axioms.50 First, the 
authors explained that Nash’s theory demonstrated that the only point 
that satisfies his axioms is the one obtained by solving the following 
maximization problem: 
maxπ1,π2 (π1 – d1) (π2 – d2)             (1) 
subject to the following conditions: 
π1 ≥ d1,             (2) 
π2 ≥ d2,             (3) 
π1 + π2 ≤ Π             (4)51 
From there, the authors examined the effects of transfer payments 
being permitted between the two parties.52 This examination provided 
the authors with three factors that fully characterized the bargaining 
problem: (1) the disagreement payoff for the patent holder; (2) the 
disagreement payoff for the infringer/licensee; and (3) the total 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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transferable wealth available to the two parties from licensing.53 The 
authors then established the conditions for the equilibrium payoffs as: 
𝜋𝜋1
∗ – d1 = 𝜋𝜋2∗ – d2,          (5) 
𝜋𝜋1
∗ + 𝜋𝜋2∗ = ∏,          (6) 
where 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖∗ represents the equilibrium payoff for firm i.54 
Next, the authors solved the conditions for the equilibrium 
payoffs, yielding the NBS: 
𝜋𝜋1
∗ = 𝑑𝑑1 + 12 (Π − 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝑑𝑑2),          (7) 
𝜋𝜋2
∗ = 𝑑𝑑2 + 12 (Π − 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝑑𝑑2),          (8) 
𝜋𝜋1
∗ + 𝜋𝜋2∗ = Π           (9)55 
The authors then explained the implications of these equations. 
First, the authors noted that equations (7) and (8) demonstrate that the 
parties “bargain over the partition of total profits (Π); they first agree 
to give each other the payment that they respectively would obtain from 
not reaching agreement; then, they split the remaining profits 
equally.”56 For either party, the agreement payoff is greater when its 
disagreement point is higher than the disagreement point of the 
opposing party.57 Therefore, the relative bargaining power is dependent 
upon either side’s “respective outside opportunities.”58 
The authors concluded their development of the NBS for the 
calculation of reasonable royalty damages by noting: 
  The fundamental insight of the NBS is that the alternatives to 
agreement that are available to each side limit how good a bargain 
the other partner can obtain. These alternatives set a lower limit on 
the share each side willingly will accept. Under the NBS, the two 
sides called upon to split a pie will divide the bargaining surplus—
which is bounded by each bargainer’s threat point or reservation 
price—down the middle, so that each has an equal share. 
  An alternative way of thinking about the NBS is in the framework 
of an implicit arbitrator who tries to distribute the gains from trade 
or, more generally, from cooperation in a manner that reflects fairly 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 55. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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the bargaining strength of the two negotiators. Once each side’s 
disagreement payoffs are determined, an arbitrator applies the NBS 
to obtain an efficient and fair solution. In the following section, we 
apply the NBS to the calculation of a reasonable royalty.59  
Choi and Weinstein’s development of the NBS in the context of 
patent damages provides a useful method for calculating reasonable 
royalty damages that is grounded in sound economic theory. Other 
scholars have applied the NBS in the context of patent damages as 
well.60 For instance, in 2007, Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, 
developed mathematical equations that applied the theory of the NBS 
to reasonable-royalty calculations.61 These equations were more 
simplified than those developed by Weinstein and Choi. First, Lemley 
and Shapiro defined the variables of their equations.62 The noteworthy 
variables included: 
 V: The Value per unit of the patented feature to the downstream firm 
in comparison with the next best alternative technology. For 
example, if the patented feature enhances the value of the product to 
consumers by $1 over the next best alternative, then V = $1. 
Similarly, if it reduces the cost of manufacturing the good by $1, 
then V = $1. . . . 
 θ: The Strength of the patent, i.e., the probability that litigation will 
result in a finding that the patent is valid and infringed by the 
downstream firm’s product. . . .  
 B: The Bargaining skill of the patent holder, as measured by the 
fraction of the combined gains from settling, rather than litigating, 
 
 59. Id. at 55–56 (citation omitted). 
 60. Legal commentators have analyzed the method and applicability of the NBS in patent 
damages calculations but have not commented on the legal aspects of its use. See, e.g., RICHARD 
F. CAULEY, WINNING THE PATENT DAMAGES CASE 26–31 (2d ed. 2011); John C. Jarosz & 
Michael J. Chapman, Application of Game Theory to Intellectual Property Royalty Negotiations, 
in LICENSING BEST PRACTICES 241–65 (Robert Goldscheider & Alan H. Gordon eds., 2006); 
Jonathan D. Putnam & Andrew B. Tepperman, Bargaining and the Construction of Economically 
Consistent Hypothetical License Negotiations, THE LICENSING JOURNAL, Aug. 2004, at 7; 
Elizabeth M. Bailey, Making Sense of “Apportionment” in Patent Damages, 12 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 255 (2011); A. Frank Adams, III et al., PATENT ROYALTY RATES: A LOOK AT 
RECENT COURT DECISIONS (2008); Chester C. McGuire, Simulation Modeling in Forensic 
Economics: The Example of Reasonable Royalty Negotiations, 4 LITIGATION ECONOMICS DIGEST 
15 (1999); T. PAUL TANPITUKPONGSE & KANAV HASIJA, GAME THEORY: A ZOOMING AND 
SLIDING METHOD FOR THE DETERMINATION OF REASONABLE ROYALTIES IN PATENT DAMAGES 
(2011). 
 61. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 10. 
 62. Id. at 1996–97. 
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that are captured by the patent holder. This variable falls between 0 
and 1. Equal bargaining skill, B = 0.5, is a common assumption.63 
Using these variables, Lemley and Shapiro explained that “the 
benchmark royalty rate for an ironclad patent is equal to B x V.”64 
Additionally, the authors demonstrated that “[m]ore generally, the 
benchmark royalty rate is given by θ x B x V.”65 While Lemley and 
Shapiro’s equations can be useful, the analysis of this article will focus 
solely on the equations developed by Choi and Weinstein. This 
reasoning is based upon Choi and Weinstein’s use of more fact-specific 
variables than the equations set forth by Lemley and Shapiro. 
II. PATENT DAMAGES CASELAW PRIOR TO THE INTRODUCTION OF 
THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION 
Before an in-depth analysis of the caselaw surrounding the NBS, 
it is useful to provide a brief overview of patent-damages caselaw prior 
to the introduction of the NBS. This overview will highlight alternative 
damages models that have been used, without providing a detailed 
analysis of each method, and will help to frame the forthcoming 
analysis of the article. 
The predominant method for calculating a reasonable-royalty rate 
has been the use of the Georgia-Pacific factors to construct a 
hypothetical negotiation.66 Other methodologies have been used with 
varying success.67 For example, one methodology that has been used is 
the analytical approach.68 This approach: 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1999. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Christopher Marchese et al., Methodologies for Determining Reasonable Royalty 
Damages, FISH & RICHARDSON, http://www.fr.com/reasonableroyalty/ (last visited Mar. 14, 
2014). 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. (“The Federal Circuit approved this method in TWM Manufacturing Co. v. Dura 
Corp., 789 F.2d 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986). There, the infringer had 
an internal memo just before infringement began projecting a gross profit of about 50% for each 
infringing sale, from which the projected net profit was computed to be about 40% of the 
anticipated sales price. As the standard industry net profit was about 10% of the sales price, the 
special master awarded the patentee a reasonable royalty damages rate of the difference—30%. 
This rate was then applied to the infringer’s actual sales figures to calculate the reasonable royalty 
damages. It had nothing to do with any hypothetical negotiation. Instead, it was strictly an 
apportionment based on the infringer’s projections. The Federal Circuit not only affirmed, but it 
also expressly rejected the infringer’s contention that the Georgia-Pacific approach was the only 
possible approach to computing reasonable royalty damages. The Federal Circuit made it clear 
that other approaches were possible, and this one was proper.”). 
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[I]nvolves calculating damages based on the infringer’s own internal 
profit projections for the infringing item at the time the infringement 
began, and then apportioning the projected profit between the parties 
as a percentage of sales. The patentee’s percentage is then applied 
to the sales dollars for the actual infringing sales to determine the 
reasonable royalty damages.69 
Additionally, patent infringement plaintiffs began using the 25% rule 
of thumb to calculate a reasonable-royalty rate.70 The 25% rule of 
thumb “presumed that a licensee in a hypothetical negotiation would 
be willing to pay a royalty rate of 25 percent of profits on the product 
that incorporated the patent at issue.”71 
In 2011, the 25% rule of thumb was held inadmissible.72 In 
Uniloc, the Federal Circuit abolished the rule as a “fundamentally 
flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical 
negotiation,” holding that “[e]vidence relying on the 25 percent rule of 
thumb is thus inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, because it fails to tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts of 
the case at issue.”73 Although Uniloc attempted to apply the Georgia-
Pacific factors to bring the 25 % royalty rate up or down, the court 
explained that, because the analysis started from a fundamentally 
flawed premise, “adjusting it based on legitimate considerations 
specific to the facts of the case nevertheless results in a fundamentally 
flawed conclusion.”74 After the 25% rule was stricken, damages experts 
began utilizing the NBS to calculate reasonable royalty damages.75  
III. PATENT CASES ADDRESSING THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION 
The cases that follow demonstrate how courts have treated the 
NBS in patent infringement cases since its introduction in 2011. While 
some courts have allowed damages experts to use the NBS to calculate 
a reasonable royalty, many courts have not. Even still, most courts that 
have allowed damages experts to use the NBS have only allowed its 
use in conjunction with other methods. This Part revolves primarily 
around the Federal Circuit’s VirnetX opinion, which precluded 
 
 69. Id. The authors also mention four other possible methodologies for calculating a 
reasonable royalty. These methodologies include “Rule of Thumb,” “Established Royalty for the 
Patent,” “Many Licenses in a Small Range of Rates,” and “Cost Savings.” Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1315. 
 74. Id. at 1317. 
 75. See infra Part III-B. 
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plaintiff’s use of the NBS, as well as the treatment of the NBS before 
and after VirnetX. 
A. Pre-VirnetX Cases Excluding the Use of the Nash 
Bargaining Solution by Damages Experts 
The United States District Courts for the Northern District of 
California and the Eastern District of Virginia are hotbeds of patent 
litigation.76 However, both courts have excluded the use of the NBS by 
damages experts.77 For example, in Oracle, the District Court for the 
Northern District of California rejected the use of the NBS in 
determining a reasonable royalty in patent damages.78 The court 
explained that, although the damages expert “purported to use the Nash 
bargaining solution to project bargaining outcomes and calculate the 
resulting payments and royalties in the hypothetical negotiation,” he 
did not adequately explain this method or tie it to the facts of the case.79 
More specifically, the court held that the damages expert “glossed over 
the axioms underlying the Nash solution without citing any evidence 
to show that those assumptions were warranted in the present case,” 
and therefore, allowing the expert to testify would have risked 
misleading the jury “as to the soundness of the foundation for his 
conclusions.”80 Further, the court explained that, because the NBS 
involves complex mathematics, “no jury could follow this Greek or 
testimony trying to explain it . . . [and the NBS] would invite a 
miscarriage of justice by clothing a fifty-percent assumption in an 
impenetrable facade of mathematics.”81 Therefore, the court excluded 
the expert’s testimony under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
and advised the use of the Georgia-Pacific factors to guide a royalty 
analysis.82  
Additionally, in Suffolk, the District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia, pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
Daubert, excluded the testimony of plaintiff’s damages expert, Roy 
 
 76.  See PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY (2014), 
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-patent-litigation-
study.pdf  
 77. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Suffolk 
Techs., LLC v. AOL Inc., No. 1:12-cv-625, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64630 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 
2013). 
 78. Oracle, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 79. Id. at 1119 (internal quotations omitted). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1120. 
 82. Id. 
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Weinstein.83 Weinstein’s damages opinion provided an analysis of the 
“revenue stream associated with the putative infringing product” under 
the Georgia-Pacific factors, and then a hypothetical negotiation under 
the NBS.84 Weinstein’s hypothetical negotiation resulted in a 50/50 
split of the incremental profits attributed to the patent-in-suit.85 The 
court held that Weinstein’s 50/50 split was not tied to the facts of the 
case and therefore, “no different from the 25% rule of thumb rejected 
in Uniloc.”86 Although Weinstein used the Georgia-Pacific factors in 
his overall analysis, the court explained that “[t]he order in which the 
Georgia-Pacific factors are applied does not change the fundamental 
and fatal flow of both calculations, namely that the hypothetical rule of 
thumb was not tied to the facts of the case.”87  
B. Pre-VirnetX Cases Excluding the Use of a 50/50 Split by 
Damages Experts 
While some damages experts have simply applied a 50/50 split 
without further mention of the NBS, courts have excluded this practice 
and likened it to the functional equivalent of the NBS. For example, in 
Dynetix, the court excluded the opinion of Plaintiff’s damages expert, 
Dr. William H. Black. Dr. Black started his opinion with “the 
presumption that ‘one reasonable starting place’ for the licensing rate 
would be half of the gross margin of the infringing products.”88 The 
court held that Dr. Black’s analysis was improper under the Uniloc 
standard.89 The court opined that Dr. Black “considered no analogous 
facts of the case here other than the presumed validity of the patent 
[and] . . . failed to cite any evidence to support his conclusion that the 
50% starting place would apply to component parts.”90 While Dr. Black 
did not mention the NBS in his analysis, it is worth noting that the court 
likened his analysis to the NBS, citing the Oracle decision.91 
 
 83. Suffolk Techs. LLC v. AOL Inc., No. 1:12-cv-625, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64630, at 
*6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2013). 
 84. Id. at *4–*5. 
 85. Id. at *5. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at *5–*6. 
 88. Dynetix Design Solutions, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., No. C 11-05973 PSG, 2013 WL 
4538210, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at *5, n.34. 
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Additionally, in Robocast, the court excluded the testimony of 
Plaintiff’s damages expert, Creighton Hoffman.92 In Hoffman’s expert 
report, he used the Georgia-Pacific factors to conclude “that an equal 
split of the benefits would be reasonable and could be negotiated by the 
parties to the hypothetical negotiation.”93 While Hoffman’s report did 
not mention NBS or game theory, the court concluded that “there is no 
doubt that the reasoning behind [Hoffman’s] purported 50/50 profit 
split is premised on these models.”94 From there, the court noted that 
Hoffman “did not discuss the relative bargaining power of Microsoft 
and Robocast.”95 Furthermore, the court held that “Mr. Hoffman's 
discussion of the facts specific to this case would be insufficient even 
if the ‘relative bargaining power’ issue did not exist.”96 Finally, the 
court concluded its analysis by noting that “while the Nash Bargaining 
Solution of a 50/50 split has a more prestigious academic pedigree than 
the 25% rule of thumb, both are non-starters in a world where damages 
must be tied to the facts of the case.”97  
C. Pre–VirtnetX Cases Allowing the Use of the Nash 
Bargaining Solution 
Other courts have also allowed damages experts to use the NBS, 
but in these cases, the NBS is used in conjunction with other methods. 
For example, in Mformation, the Northern District of California 
allowed the use of the NBS as a “check” on an analysis under the 
Georgia-Pacific factors.98 Defendants moved to exclude the testimony 
of plaintiff’s damages expert Roy Weinstein, arguing that the NBS, 
used in determining a reasonable royalty, was an impermissible rule of 
thumb.99 The court held that because Weinstein had performed an 
extensive analysis under the Georgia-Pacific factors, his use of the 
NBS “as a check on the reasonableness of the rate reached through his 
Georgia-Pacific analysis” did not constitute a ground for exclusion of 
his testimony.100 The court further explained that exclusion was not 
 
 92. Robocast, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 10-1055-RGA, 2014 WL 350062, at *3 (D. Del. 
Jan. 29, 2014).  
 93. Id. at *1. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at *3. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., No. C-08-04990 JW, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 56784, at *15–16, n.19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012), aff’d, 764 F.3d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
 99. Id. at *14. 
 100. Id. at *15–*16, n.19. 
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necessary because “Weinstein used [the NBS] in addition to, rather 
than in lieu of, the Georgia-Pacific analysis.”101 This case provides an 
example of when courts allow the use of the NBS but only in a limited 
sense. This court did not allow the use of the NBS as the sole method 
in calculating a reasonable royalty. 
Additionally, in Summit 6, Judge Reed O’Connor of the Northern 
District of Texas allowed plaintiff’s use of the NBS.102 Defendant 
argued that Plaintiff’s damages expert, Benoit, used a flawed analysis, 
combining the use of a non-patent-practicing component of the device, 
reliance on market research surveys, and application of the NBS.103 
Defendant argued that the use of the NBS was an improper 50% rule 
of thumb that had been rejected by courts.104 However, “Benoit testified 
that the NBS only looks to surplus profit, and allows for a variance in 
dividing the surplus profit where there is an otherwise unquantifiable 
difference in the bargaining position.”105 Accordingly, the court found 
that Benoit’s use of the NBS was not an improper 50% rule of thumb, 
but actually “based on his belief that because neither party had a 
stronger negotiating position, they would have split the profits 
evenly.106 The court also emphasized that: 
[T]he Federal Circuit's explanation that a district court should not 
use Daubert “to evaluate the correctness of facts underlying an 
expert's testimony. Questions about what facts are most relevant or 
reliable to calculating a reasonable royalty are for the jury. The jury 
was entitled to hear the expert testimony and decide for itself what 
to accept or reject.”107 
Moreover, in Sanofi-Aventis, the court allowed the use of the NBS 
by the plaintiffs’ damages expert.108 Although the court never explicitly 
mentioned the NBS, plaintiff’s expert Mohan Rao determined his 
reasonable-royalty rate using game theory, which is synonymous with 
the NBS.109 The defendants, Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, moved to 
preclude the plaintiffs from offering expert testimony utilizing the 
 
 101. Id. at *16, n.19. 
 102. Summit 6 LLC v. Research in Motion Corp., No. 3:11-cv-367-O, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 95164, at *32 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 2013). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at *36–*37. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. (quoting i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 856 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
 108. Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm., Inc., USA, No. 07-CV-5855, 
2011 WL 383861, at *13 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2011). 
 109. Id. at 12.  
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NBS.110 Defendants argued that the NBS is indistinguishable from the 
25% rule of thumb because it essentially applies a 50% rule of thumb 
to determine the reasonable-royalty rate.111 Defendants argued that the 
damages expert “mechanically applied a 50/50 profit split” between the 
parties.112 On the other hand, plaintiffs argued that the NBS is “the 
standard model in economics for calculating the outcome of a 
negotiation, is recognized as a scientific method in determining 
reasonable-royalty rates, and is unrelated to the 25 percent rule rejected 
in Uniloc.”113 Additionally, plaintiffs argued that the damages expert 
reached his result under the NBS “after considering the facts of the 
case, specifically the relationship between the parties and their relative 
bargaining power, the relationship between the patent and the accused 
product, the standard profit margins in the industry, and the presumed 
validity of the patent.”114 Ultimately, the court determined that the 
damages expert “did not arbitrarily apply a 50/50 profit split akin to the 
25 percent rule rejected in Uniloc but rather based his reasonable 
royalty analysis on the specific facts of this case.”115  
Additionally, in Gen Probe, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of California ruled on a Daubert motion to exclude 
testimony of Gen-Probe’s damages expert, Michael Wagner.116 
Wagner’s damages report was based on the NBS and the entire-market-
value rule.117 Becton Dickinson argued that Wagner’s calculations 
were based on arbitrary profit splits similar to the 25% rule of thumb.118 
Gen-Probe countered that Wagner’s calculations “were influenced, 
appropriately, by the facts of the case, including the competitive 
environment and Gen-Probe’s policy of exploiting its own patents—
considerations approved in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.”119 The court 
agreed with Gen-Probe, holding that Wagner’s analysis was tied to the 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at *13. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Gen-Probe Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., No.3:09-cv-02319-BENNLS, 2012 WL 
9335913 (S.D. Cal Nov. 26, 2012). 
 117. See TWM Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“The entire 
market value rule allows for the recovery of damages based on the value of an entire apparatus 
containing several features, when the feature patented constitutes the basis for customer 
demand.”). 
 118. Id. at *3. 
 119. Id. (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
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facts of the case and that his testimony would not be excluded on those 
grounds.120 
Finally, in VirnetX, Judge Leonard Davis of the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Texas allowed plaintiff’s use of the 
NBS.121 Defendant argued that the testimony of plaintiff’s damages 
expert, Roy Weinstein, should have been excluded because of his use 
of the NBS.122 Defendant maintained that Weinstein’s use of the NBS 
was improper because he failed to use generally accepted methods of 
applying the NBS, failed to explain why a 45%–55% profit split 
between the parties would have occurred, and arbitrarily applied a 
profit split “akin to the disdained 25% rule,” having “no basis in 
reality.”123 The court held, however, that Weinstein adequately 
supported his NBS-based theory, providing substantial evidence to 
support his theory.124 First, Weinstein calculated the contribution of the 
patented feature to defendant’s total profits “by estimating the price 
differential between the accused product and the last previous version 
of the product not capable of supporting the feature.”125  
Next, Weinstein reduced the revenue by the percentage of the 
revenue associated with the addition of the patented feature, relying on 
the price of the technology that enabled the feature.126 Finally, 
Weinstein accounted for the 45%–55% profit split, “explaining that 
[plaintiff] would have been in a weaker bargaining position at the time 
of the negotiation because of its financial situation.”127 Weinstein’s use 
of the NBS was admissible because it was adequately applied to the 
facts of the case.128 This case demonstrates that the resulting royalty 
rate under the NBS will not always be 50%. Instead, the bargaining 
power of either party has the potential to bring the rate up or down. 
While the examples are few and far between, Weinstein’s use of the 
NBS was proper, and as a result, was allowed by the court. 
D. VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. 
The Federal Circuit recently issued an opinion regarding the 
disparity among federal district courts’ treatment of the Nash 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. See VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 816 (E.D. Tex. 2013). 
 122. Id. at 838–39. 
 123. Id. at 839. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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Bargaining Solution.129 The Federal Circuit agreed “with the courts that 
have rejected invocations of the Nash theorem without sufficiently 
establishing that the premises of the theorem actually apply to the facts 
of the case at hand.”130 More specifically, the court explained: 
The problem with Weinstein's use of the Nash Bargaining Solution, 
though somewhat different, is related, and just as fatal to the 
soundness of the testimony. The Nash theorem arrives at a result that 
follows from a certain set of premises. It itself asserts nothing about 
what situations in the real world fit those premises. Anyone seeking 
to invoke the theorem as applicable to a particular situation must 
establish that fit, because the 50/50 profit-split result is proven by 
the theorem only on those premises. Weinstein did not do so. This 
was an essential failing in invoking the Solution. Moreover, we do 
not believe that the reliability of this methodology is saved by 
Weinstein's attempts to account for the unique facts of the case in 
deviating from the 50/50 starting point.131 
The court further warned that “Weinstein's thin attempts to 
explain his 10% deviation from the 50/50 baseline in this case 
demonstrate how this methodology is subject to abuse. . . . Such 
conclusory assertions cannot form the basis of a jury's verdict.”132 
Additionally, the court expressed concern that “[a]lthough the result of 
that equation would be mathematically sound if properly applied by the 
jury, there is concern that the high royalty base would cause the jury to 
deviate upward from the proper outcome.”133 Finally, the court did note 
one difference between the NBS and the 25% rule of thumb: “where 
the 25% rule was applied to the entire profits associated with the 
allegedly infringing product, the Nash theory focuses only on the 
incremental profits earned by the infringer from the use of the asserted 
patents.”134 
There are several key takeaways from the Federal Circuit’s 
opinion. First, the court did not place an outright bar on the use of the 
NBS. Rather, it merely held that Weinstein’s application of the NBS 
was insufficiently tied to the facts of the case.135 
 
 129. See VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014). This was an 
appeal from the VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc. decision discussed in Part IV-D. 
 130. Id. at 1332. 
 131. Id. at 1332–33.  
 132. Id. at 1333. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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Second, the court provided guidance as to how an expert could 
properly apply the NBS, explaining that the NBS is only applicable 
when the facts of the case fit the premises provided by the NBS.136 For 
example, one of the premises previously mentioned is that there should 
be no other feasible allocation that is (a) better than the solution for one 
negotiator and (b) not worse than the solution for the other 
negotiator.137 Thus, an expert attempting to utilize the NBS must be 
able to demonstrate from the facts of the case, that this premise, along 
with the others, is met. Once this showing is made, the expert can then 
apply the NBS, using the model developed by Choi and Weinstein. 
Third, the Federal Circuit hinted at the possibility of the exclusion 
of the NBS based upon the specific facts of a case. For example, if the 
facts of a particular case could not fit the premises of the NBS, the NBS 
could not be applied regardless of how clear the expert explained its 
methodology or how intimately the facts were tied to the application. 
Fourth, the court’s opinion did not render Choi and Weinstein’s 
theory useless simply because Weinstein’s application was held 
inadmissible. As explained above, if the facts of a case fit the premises 
of the NBS, Choi and Weinstein’s model can be used to determine a 
reasonable royalty. Here, although Weinstein applied the facts of the 
case to his model, evidenced by the deviation from the 50/50 starting 
point, he failed to show that the facts of the case fit the starting premises 
of the NBS. Thus, Choi and Weinstein’s method is still a useful method 
when the premises are met by the facts of a case. 
Regardless, because the Federal Circuit did not place an outright 
bar on the use of the NBS, it still stands as a reliable method of 
calculating patent damages. 
E. Post-VirnetX Treatment of the NBS 
Since the Federal Circuit’s VirnetX opinion, one district court has 
addressed the use of the NBS.138 In Sentius, defendant Microsoft 
attempted to exclude plaintiff’s damages expert, Robert Mills.139 Mills 
used an approach known as “income theory” to determine the 
incremental profits earned by the infringer from the use of the asserted 
patents.140 From there, Mills determined how the parties would divide 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. See supra Part I. 
 138. See Sentius Int’l, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 5:13-cv-00825-PSG, 2015 WL 451950 
(Jan. 27, 2015).  
 139. Id. at *1. 
 140. Id. at *9. 
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these incremental profits based on their relative bargaining positions—
the NBS.141 Microsoft argued that Mills’ analysis was flawed because 
his “analysis of the parties’ relative bargaining strengths is ‘hand-
waving at best.’”142  
However, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California held that Mills did not “follow an unprincipled 
‘rule of thumb’ approach similar to the theories that the Federal Circuit 
rejected in VirnetX and Uniloc to reach his conclusions about the 
relative bargaining power of parties.”143 The court went on to explain 
that Mills analyzed how various factors impacted the parties’ 
bargaining strengths and did not follow an unprincipled “rule of 
thumb” approach, similar to the theories that the Federal Circuit 
rejected in VirnetX and Uniloc to reach his conclusions about the 
relative bargaining power of parties, but unlike in VirnetX, where 
Weinstein “relied on ‘rules of thumb’ without establishing that those 
rules applied to the hypothetical negotiation at issue.”144 
Moreover, Microsoft attempted to argue that Mills’ analysis was 
insufficient because his determination of the parties’ bargaining 
strength was either generic, favored Microsoft, or did not support any 
quantitative value.145 However, the court held that these complaints did 
not warrant exclusion of Mills’ analysis because “they either 
mischaracterize Mills’ analysis or go to weight, not admissibility.”146 
Although the court never explicitly mentions the NBS, it is clear 
that Mills’ application of specific facts to determine the parties’ relative 
bargaining positions is such an application. Citing the Federal Circuit’s 
criticism of the NBS, the court found that Mills’ application was 
admissible. This case reaffirms some of the key takeaways mentioned 
previously—namely, that the Federal Circuit did not place an outright 
bar on the NBS. Additionally, Sentius suggests that experts have 
learned from the Federal Circuit’s guidance, and are more equipped to 
apply the NBS without judicial hostility. 
 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at *10. 
 146. Id.  
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IV. THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION SHOULD BE A VIABLE 
METHOD USED IN CALCULATING REASONABLE ROYALTY 
DAMAGES IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES 
Courts should allow the use of the NBS by damages experts as a 
viable method for calculating a reasonable royalty in patent 
infringement cases for three reasons. First the NBS, if properly used, 
adequately applies the facts of each specific case to its analysis. 
Second, the NBS is grounded in sound, unmanipulable economic 
theory that can be adequately explained. Finally, the NBS is more 
impartial than the Georgia-Pacific factor analysis. 
A. The Nash Bargaining Solution Applies the Facts of the Case 
When the NBS is properly used by utilizing the equations set forth 
by Choi and Weinstein, it ties the specific facts of each case to its 
analysis.147 One of the main criticisms by courts about the NBS is the 
lack of tying the specific facts of the case to its analysis.148 However, it 
is noteworthy that none of the courts that have excluded the use of the 
NBS have explicitly held that the NBS, in and of itself, does not utilize 
the specific facts of the case.149 Rather, courts have admonished 
damages experts’ lack of tying specific facts of the case in their analysis 
of the NBS.150 Therefore, it is not the NBS itself that has been 
criticized, but rather, experts’ application of the NBS. It is evident, 
upon further examination, that the NBS equations developed by Choi 
and Weinstein require facts that are specific to the parties of the case.  
First, the variables of the Choi and Weinstein equations require 
data that is specific to the parties involved in the hypothetical 
negotiation. For example, d1 represents the disagreement profit of the 
patent holder.151 To effectively utilize these equations, this variable 
must be satisfied with a value that is specific to the patent holder at 
issue. Likewise, d2 represents the disagreement profit of the 
infringer/licensee.152 This variable must also be satisfied with a value 
that is specific to the infringer at issue. Thus, these variables require 
direct use of the facts of the case.  
 
 147. For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that a showing that the specific facts of a 
case fits the premises of the NBS has already occurred. Thus, an application of the Choi–
Weinstein model is all that remains to properly apply the NBS.  
 148. See VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also 
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 149. See supra Part III-C. 
 150. See Oracle, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1119. 
 151. Choi & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 54. 
 152. Id. 
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As an example, we will assume that the disagreement profit for 
both the patent holder and infringer is zero. A value of zero for both of 
these variables would mean that “without a license, neither the licensor 
nor the licensee obtains benefits from the patented technology.”153 For 
purposes of the equations, d1 and d2 equal zero. When these values are 
plugged into equations (7) and (8), the result becomes: 
𝜋𝜋1
∗ = 1
2
Π,          (10) 
𝜋𝜋2
∗ = 1
2
Π,            (11)154 
These resulting equations demonstrate that when, without a 
license, neither party obtains benefit from the patented technology, 
each party receives half of the total incremental profit, Π.155 This 
scenario demonstrates how the dreaded 50/50 split result from the NBS, 
admonished by courts, can occur.156 However, this split did not result 
without the use of the facts of the case.  
The above calculation is the most simplistic use of the NBS in the 
patent-damages context. Obviously, we live in a world with multiple 
suppliers, and one or both of the parties will typically have some 
disagreement profit—an alternative plan in the case that licensing 
negotiations fail. Therefore, d1 and d2 will rarely ever equal zero, but 
there are some cases when it will.157 For example, in a suit where 
infringement is found, the infringer will be required to stop utilizing 
the patented invention.158 Thus, d2 will generally equal zero.159 
Additionally, in cases where the patent holder is a non-practicing entity 
and does not offer products utilizing the patent, d1 will equal zero 
because there will be no profit to be made in the event that a license is 
not executed.160 
Even when the NBS calculation does not result in a 50/50 split of 
incremental profit, the calculation of the NBS still requires the 
application of the facts of the case. For example, Choi and Weinstein 
demonstrated the result of their equations in a two-supplier world, 
where both parties possess production capabilities.161 There, “the 
 
 153. Weinstein, supra note 31, at 556. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See supra Part III. 
 157. Weinstein, supra note 31, at 556–57. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Choi & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 58. 
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disagreement payoff for the patent holder is the profit it can earn as the 
high-cost, sole producer of its patented product.”162 This produces the 
following function for solving d1: 
𝑑𝑑1 = 𝑃𝑃1𝑄𝑄1 − 𝐶𝐶1𝑄𝑄1           (12)163 
In this equation, C1(Q1) is the patent holder’s cost function, P1 is 
the profit-maximizing price, and Q1 is the profit-maximizing quantity, 
absent the infringer.164 Furthermore, the disagreement profit for the 
infringer is “equal to the [infringer’s] opportunity cost,” which is the 
return foregone from manufacturing the technology.165 This results in 
the following total incremental profit function from licensing: 
Π = 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 − 𝐶𝐶2𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚     (13)166 
Plugging these functions into equations (7) and (8) results in the 
following: 
𝜋𝜋1
∗ = 𝑑𝑑1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚−𝐶𝐶2(𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚)−𝑑𝑑1−𝑑𝑑22 = 𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚,   (14) 
𝜋𝜋2
∗ = 𝑑𝑑2 + 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚−𝐶𝐶2(𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚)−𝑑𝑑1−𝑑𝑑22 = 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 − 𝐶𝐶2(𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚) − 𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 ,   (15) 
𝜋𝜋1
∗ + 𝜋𝜋2∗ = Π = 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 − 𝐶𝐶2(𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚)    (16)167 
In these equations, r represents the per-unit royalty.168 Solving for 
r results in the following: 
𝑟𝑟 = 1
2
[𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 − 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶2] + 12𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 [𝑑𝑑1 − 𝑑𝑑2],   (17) 
where AC2 represents the infringer’s average total cost.169 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 57. 
 166. Id. at 59. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 57. 
 169. Id. at 58. (The authors also develop a per-royalty function for the one-supplier world. 
Id. at 57–58. The function is as follows: 
𝑟𝑟 = 12 [𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 − 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶2] + 12𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚 [𝑑𝑑1 − 𝑑𝑑2] 
Id. Additionally, the authors’ equations provide flexibility for other factors. Id. For instance, “if 
viable and noninfringing substitutes exist for the patented product, then the elasticity of demand 
for the patented product is larger,” which lowers the market power and profitability associated 
with the patent. Id. at 60. Furthermore, the existence of substitute products also will have the effect 
of lowering d1, which further lowers the royalty rate. Id.). 
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It is worth noting that “[i]f both sides have equal disagreement payoffs, 
then additional profits achieved from licensing are split equally.”170 
Furthermore, the royalty rates change as the disagreement payoffs 
change.171 “As one side’s outside opportunity improves, the terms of 
the licensing agreement become more favorable.”172 
While these equations are complex, and in most cases, will require 
a damages expert to calculate a reasonable royalty, it is easy to see that 
the NBS requires the use of the specific facts of each case. When used 
correctly, courts should not object to damages experts’ use of the NBS 
for the reason that it does not apply the specific facts of the case. 
However, courts have also complained that the NBS cannot be 
adequately explained. 
B. The Nash Bargaining Solution Can Be Adequately Explained 
Another common complaint among courts excluding the use of 
the NBS is the lack of adequate explanation of its theory.173 However, 
although mathematically complex, the theory behind the NBS can be 
adequately explained such that even a lay juryperson could understand. 
In the article by Weinstein, Romig, and Stabile, the authors use the 
equations developed by Choi and Weinstein to point out how easily 
understandable the NBS is in the context of reasonable royalty 
damages.174 The authors explain that: 
As previously discussed, the NBS must satisfy two very simple 
conditions: (1) no other feasible outcome is better than one side and 
not worse than the other and (2) neither side is worse off reaching 
an agreement than if no agreement were reached. Additionally, the 
“complex mathematical formulas” can be reduced to a single 
sentence: each negotiating party receives the profit it would have 
made absent an agreement and splits the remaining profits equally. 
These concepts are easily understandable by jurors.175 
Because the NBS can be explained in a simplified manner, as 
demonstrated by Weinstein, Stabile, and Romig, its inadmissibility 
under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is unwarranted.176 Its 
simplified explanation, although grounded in complex mathematics, 
 
 170. Id. at 59. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. at 59–60. 
 173. See supra Part III-C. 
 174. See Weinstein, supra note 31. 
 175. Id. at 560. 
 176. See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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does not pose any of the risks contained in Rule 403—unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, 
or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.177 You will recall that in 
Oracle, the court took issue with the complex mathematics involved 
with the NBS and excluded the expert testimony under Rule 403.178 
The court held that “[n]o jury could follow this Greek or testimony 
trying to explain it . . . [and the NBS] would invite a miscarriage of 
justice by clothing a fifty-percent assumption in an impenetrable facade 
of mathematics.”179 However, because the NBS does not pose any 
threat admonished in Rule 403, exclusion of damages expert opinion 
utilizing the NBS under Rule 403 is a grave misapplication of the law.  
Additionally, many opponents seek to exclude expert testimony 
of the NBS under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 
explains that the role of an expert witness is to “help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”180 The rule 
ensures that the expert is credible by requiring that his testimony is 
based on sufficient facts or data, the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and the expert has reliably applied the 
principles and methods to the facts of the case.181 Nowhere in the rule 
does it provide that an expert’s testimony may be excluded because of 
its complex nature. In fact, most expert testimony is complex in 
nature—they are, in fact, experts. 
When the NBS is placed against the litmus test of Rule 702, it 
passes with flying colors. First, the testimony must help the trier of fact 
to understand evidence or determine a fact at issue.182 Here, the NBS is 
used to help the trier of fact determine a reasonable royalty rate—a fact 
at issue. Therefore, the NBS satisfies this condition. 
Next, the testimony of the expert must be based on sufficient facts 
or data.183 As discussed in Part IV-A, the calculation of the NBS 
requires many data points that are derived directly from the facts.184 In 
fact, none of the variables involve values that do not stem from the facts 
of the case. While an expert may attempt to apply inaccurate data that 
does not stem from the facts of the case, such a practice should go to 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 179. Id.  
 180. FED. R. EVID. 720. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See supra Part IV-A. 
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the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility. Therefore, the NBS 
also meets this condition. 
Additionally, the testimony must be the product of reliable 
principles and methods.185 As discussed previously, the NBS has been 
in existence for over 60 years.186 Over that span, many economists have 
tested its theory.187 Economic literature is replete with articles 
describing, testing, and commending the NBS.188 It is now held as 
generally accepted economic theory.189 This makes sense, given its 
receipt of a Nobel Prize in economics.190 Therefore, the NBS also meets 
this condition. 
Finally, the expert must reliably apply the principles and methods 
to the facts of the case.191 As discussed in Part IV-A, when the values, 
stemming from the specific facts of the case, are inputted into the 
variables of the NBS, a reasonable royalty rate is calculated. 
Accordingly, when a practitioner uses the NBS properly, it is inevitable 
that the method and principles of the NBS will be applied with the 
specific facts of the case. Thus, the NBS meets this condition and 
satisfies all of the conditions of Rule 702. 
However, the reliability inquiry of the NBS does not stop there. 
The testimony must also overcome a Daubert challenge.192 The notes 
of the advisory committee for Rule 702 explain: 
Daubert set forth a non-exclusive checklist for trial courts to use in 
assessing the reliability of scientific expert testimony. The specific 
factors explicated by the Daubert Court are (1) whether the expert's 
technique or theory can be or has been tested—that is, whether the 
expert's theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or 
whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that 
cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the 
technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication; 
(3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory 
when applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and 
 
 185. FED. R. EVID. 720. 
 186. See supra Part II. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. FED. R. EVID. 720. 
 192. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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controls; and (5) whether the technique or theory has been generally 
accepted in the scientific community.193  
Because the NBS is a long-standing, generally accepted economic 
theory that has been subject to peer-review and extensive publication, 
it is apparent that these factors weigh in favor of the NBS’s 
 
 193. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (“Courts both before and after Daubert 
have found other factors relevant in determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable 
to be considered by the trier of fact.”). These factors include: 
(1) Whether experts are “proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly 
out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they 
have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying.” Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995). 
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an 
unfounded conclusion. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) 
(noting that in some cases a trial court “may conclude that there is simply too great 
an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered”). 
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious, alternative explanations. See 
Claar v. Burlington N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994) (testimony excluded where 
the expert failed to consider other obvious causes for the plaintiff’s condition). 
Compare Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (the possibility 
of some uneliminated causes presents a question of weight, so long as the most 
obvious causes have been considered and reasonably ruled out by the expert). 
(4) Whether the expert “is being as careful as he would be in his regular professional work 
outside his paid litigation consulting.” Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 
940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997). See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176 
(1999) (Daubert requires the trial court to assure itself that the expert “employs in 
the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of 
an expert in the relevant field.”). 
(5) Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results 
for the type of opinion the expert would give. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 
119 S. Ct. 1167, 1175 (1999) (Daubert’s general-acceptance factor does not “help 
show that an expert’s testimony is reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability, 
as, for example, do theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles 
of astrology or necromancy.”); Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (en banc) (clinical doctor was properly precluded from testifying to the 
toxicological cause of the plaintiff’s respiratory problem, where the opinion was not 
sufficiently grounded in scientific methodology); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 
855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting testimony based on “clinical ecology” as 
unfounded and unreliable). 
All of these factors remain relevant to the determination of the reliability of expert testimony 
under the rule as amended. Other factors may also be relevant. See Kumho, 119 S. Ct. at 1176 
(“[W]e conclude that the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular 
case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.”). Yet no single 
factor is necessarily dispositive of the reliability of a particular expert’s testimony. See, e.g., 
Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[N]ot only must each stage of 
the expert’s testimony be reliable, but each stage must be evaluated practically and flexibly 
without bright-line exclusionary (or inclusionary) rules.”); Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that some expert disciplines 
“have the courtroom as a principal theatre of operations” and as to these disciplines “the fact that 
the expert has developed an expertise principally for purposes of litigation will obviously not be 
a substantial consideration.”). 
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reliability.194 Even still, a rejection of expert testimony is the exception 
rather than the rule.195 
Courts should not abandon the use of the NBS simply because it 
may be too complex for a jury to understand. Instead, courts should 
leave this determination in the hands of the jury. If a jury feels that the 
testimony involving the NBS is “a fifty-percent assumption in an 
impenetrable facade of mathematics,”196 they can choose to not give 
any weight to the expert’s testimony. The reliability of the NBS, 
however, is well-established and should not provide a basis for courts 
to exclude its use. 
C. The Nash Bargaining Solution is More Impartial than the 
Manipulable Georgia-Pacific Factor Analysis 
While the Georgia-Pacific analysis has been used for over 30 
years to calculate a reasonable-royalty rate,197 it is easily manipulable 
and should be abandoned in favor of the more impartial NBS. As Choi 
and Weinstein point out, the Georgia-Pacific analysis “can produce a 
royalty rate unsupported by economic theory.”198 
First, the Georgia-Pacific analysis can be easily manipulated and 
difficult to understand. For example, a plaintiff, attempting to garner a 
high royalty rate, may emphasize a few factors while leaving out other 
important factors that may be detrimental to its position.199 Vice versa, 
a defendant may emphasize only a few factors in an attempt to establish 
a low royalty rate.200 Choi and Weinstein explain that what can result 
is “an unsound calculation shrouded by ‘reliance’ on the Georgia-
Pacific factors.”201 Professor Tom Cotter from the University of 
Minnesota Law School, opined that the “Georgia-Pacific factors . . . 
can be easily manipulated by the trier of fact to reach virtually any 
outcome.”202 Additionally, one commentator explained that, “[t]he 
 
 194.  See supra Part I.  
 195. Id. 
 196. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 197. See supra INTRODUCTION. 
 198. Choi & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 51. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Merritt J. Hasbrouck, Comment, Protecting the Gates of Reasonable Royalty: A 
Damages Framework For Patent Infringement Cases, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 
192, 200 (2011) (quoting Tom Cotter, Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, Univ. of Minn. Law 
Sch., Remarks at the Federal Trade Commission Hearing On: The Evolving IP Marketplace—
Remedies, Panel 1: Standards for Assessing Patent Damages and Their Implementation by Courts 
1, at 39 (Feb. 11, 2009)). 
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factors do not give clear guidance on how to calculate damages awards 
because there is no standardized way to apply or prioritize the 
factors.”203 Moreover, courts have expressed aversion for the Georgia-
Pacific analysis. The Federal Circuit has described the Georgia-Pacific 
analysis as “a difficult judicial chore, seeming often to involve more 
the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge.”204 Finally, in Gasser 
Chair Co., Inc. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., the court held that “[i]t 
would be an affectation of research to cite the countless cases which 
simply reiterate the ‘Georgia–Pacific’ factors to be considered in 
determining a reasonable royalty. . . . To set out those fifteen factors 
would also needlessly burden this decision.”205 
Next, the NBS provides a more impartial reasonable-royalty-rate 
determination than the Georgia-Pacific analysis. Because the NBS is 
mathematical, it provides less wiggle room for manipulability than the 
Georgia-Pacific analysis. Conversely, because the Georgia-Pacific 
factors are not based upon mathematics, they are analyzed from a 
subjective perspective. It would be naïve, however, to assert that the 
NBS is wholly impartial. A damages expert could input incorrect 
values to manipulate the results, but this manipulation should be more 
readily apparent to a jury member. It would be easier for a jury member 
to ascertain that the cost variable of an NBS analysis has been 
manipulated, than it would to ascertain that a damages expert is 
advocating an unreasonable-royalty rate by simply stating the basis for 
his rate as a subjective analysis of the various Georgia-Pacific factors. 
While the NBS may be a better method than the Georgia-Pacific 
analysis, a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of the Georgia-Pacific 
analysis is beyond the scope of this article. However, a future article 
may be useful to analyze the effectiveness of the NBS compared to the 
effectiveness of the Georgia-Pacific analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts should allow the use of the NBS as a viable method to 
calculate a reasonable royalty in patent infringement cases because, if 
properly used, the NBS adequately applies the facts of each specific 
case, is grounded in sound, unmanipulable economic theory, and is 
more impartial than the Georgia-Pacific analysis. Courts have 
excluded the use of the NBS due to its improper use by damages 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. Fromson v. W. Litho. Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 205. Gasser Chair Co., Inc. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 943 F. Supp. 201, 216 (E.D. N.Y. 
1996). 
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experts. However, as shown here, the NBS, when used correctly, 
provides an impartial theory to calculate reasonable royalty damages. 
Its theory has been established as sound, accepted economic theory 
over the past 60 years, and it is the most useful way to determine an 
accurate reasonable royalty. Furthermore, a proper application of the 
NBS takes into account the relative bargaining positions of both parties, 
and adjusts the royalty rate accordingly. 
As recently exemplified in a recent Federal Circuit opinion, proper 
use of the NBS is vital to its viability as a proper method to calculate a 
reasonable royalty. Accordingly, proper use can be encouraged by a 
simple technique used by many mathematics teachers—show your 
work. If the equations by Choi and Weinstein are utilized, and damages 
experts show how they calculated the values for the variables involved, 
courts can rest assured that the damages experts are tying the specific 
facts of the case to their analysis. 
